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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR KING COUNTY

JASON STAHL, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

ACCELLION USA LLC, a Washington limited
liability company,

Defendants.

NO.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR:

1. Negligence;
2. Violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW § 19.86, *et seq.*

Plaintiff Jason Stahl, by and through his counsel, brings this Class Action Complaint against Defendant ACCELLION USA LLC, a Washington limited liability company (“Accellion”) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, and alleges, upon personal knowledge as to his own actions and his counsel’s investigations, and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff brings this class action lawsuit his own behalf, and on behalf of a Class of similarly situated individuals, against Defendant for its failure to protect the sensitive, confidential information of individuals in the state of Washington—including such information as the person’s name, social security number and/or driver’s license or state identification

1 number, bank account number and bank routing number, and place of employment (“Personal
2 Information”).

3 2. On or about February 1, 2021, the Office of the Washington State Auditor
4 (“SAO”) announced that the Personal Information of approximately 1.6 million individuals in
5 the State of Washington was compromised in a data security breach of its file transfer software
6 vendor, Accellion (the “Data Breach”).

7 3. Accellion is a software company that provides hosted file transfer services.
8 Accellion makes and sells a file transfer service product called “FTA.” However, as of late
9 2020, the FTA program was an outdated “legacy product” that was “nearing end-of life”¹ and
10 was vulnerable to compromise. For several years prior to the Data Breach, Accellion had been
11 telling its customers to “upgrade” to Accellion’s new, secure file sharing program called
12 kiteworks “to add a critical layer of security.”²

13 4. At the time of the Data Breach, the SAO used the legacy FTA program to
14 transfer files.

15 5. Beginning as early as December 2020, and continuing into January 2021,
16 attackers exploited vulnerabilities in the FTA software to gain unauthorized access to files that
17 were being transferred using the FTA product.

18 6. The attackers were able to exploit vulnerabilities in Accellion’s FTA product
19 to access SAO files containing Personal Information. Included among the SAO files
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21 ¹ <https://www.accellion.com/company/press-releases/accellion-provides-update-to-recent-fts-security-incident/>

22 ² Accellion, *Upgrade to Accellion kiteworks: Introducing Accellion’s Secure and*
23 *Compliant File Sharing Program*, available at
24 <https://www.accellion.com/sites/default/files/resources/datasheet-upgrade-fts-to-kiteworks.pdf>
(last visited Feb. 1, 2021).

1 compromised in the Data Breach were claims records of over 1.6 million Washington residents
2 who filed unemployment insurance claims between January and December 2020.

3 7. Defendant was aware that FTA was an inadequately secure product, yet sold
4 this vulnerable product to SAO for the transfer of Personal Information. Defendant's failure to
5 ensure that the FTA provided adequate security protocols jeopardized the Personal Information
6 of millions of Washington residents, including Plaintiff and the Class, fell well short of
7 Defendant's obligations, and also fell short of Plaintiff's and other Class members' reasonable
8 expectations for protection of their information.

9 8. As a result of Defendant's conduct and the ensuing Data Breach, Plaintiff and
10 the members of the proposed Class have suffered actual damages, and are at imminent risk of
11 future harm, including identity theft and fraud that would result in monetary loss. Accordingly,
12 Plaintiff brings suit, on behalf of himself and Class of all others similarly situated, to seek
13 redress for Defendant's unlawful conduct.

14 II. PARTIES

15 9. Plaintiff Stahl is an individual and is a resident of Seattle, King County,
16 Washington. Plaintiff filed for unemployment benefits with the State of Washington in 2020.

17 10. Defendant ACCELLION USA LLC is a Washington limited liability
18 company, with its main office located at 1804 Embarcadero Rd, Ste 200, Palo Alto, California
19 94303.

20 III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

21 11. Jurisdiction is appropriate in this Court pursuant to RCW 2.08.010.
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1 16. Accellion markets its products as a means by which to safely transfer Personal
2 Information and sensitive content across file sharing:

3 **When employees click the Accellion button, they know it's the safe, secure**
4 **way to share sensitive information with the outside world.**⁵

5 17. One of Accellion's file transfer products is Accellion FTA. "Accellion FTA
6 helps worldwide enterprises . . . transfer large and sensitive files securely using a 100% private
7 cloud, on-premise or hosted."⁶

8 18. But even Accellion itself recognizes that its FTA program is inadequate to
9 keep files transfers secure, admitting that "in today's breach-filled, over-regulated world, you
10 need even broader protection and control" than FTA can offer.⁷

11 19. In a recent interview, Joel York, Accellion's Chief Marketing Officer, said
12 that the Data Breach involved FTA, which he described as a 20-year-old "legacy product."
13 Mr. York said that the company has been encouraging customers to stop using FTA, stating: "It
14 just wasn't designed for these types of threats"⁸

15 20. Mr. York's recent statement was not the first of its kind. Although the FTA
16 product was inadequately secure and subject to vulnerabilities and cyberattack threats,

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18 _____
19 ⁵ *Id.*

20 ⁶ *About Accellion*, Accellion.com, <https://www.accellion.com/products/fta/> (last visited
21 Feb. 1, 2021)

22 ⁷ *Id.*

23 ⁸ Jim Brunner & Paul Roberts, *Personal data of 1.6 million Washington unemployment*
24 *claimants exposed in hack of state auditor*, Seattle Times (Feb. 1, 2021),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/personal-data-of-1-6-million-washington-unemployment-claimants-exposed-in-hack-of-state-auditor/?utm_source=marketingcloud&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=BNA_020121185309+BREAKING+Data+compromised+for+1.6+million+Washingtonians_2_1_2021&utm_term=Registered%20User.

1 Accellion had been encouraging its users to upgrade to Accellion’s newer product, known as
2 kiteworks, for several years.

3 21. Accellion’s Chief Information Security Officer Frank Balonis stated: “Future
4 exploits of [FTA], however, are a constant threat. We have encouraged all FTA customers to
5 migrate to kiteworks for the last three years and have accelerated our FTA end-of-life plans in
6 light of these attacks. We remain committed to assisting our FTA customers, but strongly urge
7 them to migrate to kiteworks as soon as possible.”⁹

8 22. Despite the vulnerabilities in the FTA system, Accellion continued to provide
9 the FTA platform to its customers, including to the SAO. And SAO continued to use
10 Accellion’s insecure product to transfer highly sensitive Personal Information.

11 **B. The Data Breach**

12 23. In mid-December 2020, “Accellion was made aware of a zero-day
13 vulnerability in its legacy FTA software.”¹⁰

14 24. While Accellion made attempts to patch the vulnerability it initially identified,
15 “Accellion identified additional exploits in the ensuing weeks and rapidly developed and
16 released patches to close each vulnerability.” *Id.* The cyberattack continued from at least mid-
17 December and into January 2021, as cyber attackers continued to exploit vulnerabilities in the
18 FTA product.

19 25. During the December 2020 cyber-attack, an unauthorized person was able to
20 exploit a software vulnerability in Accellion’s FTA product and gain access to files that were

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22 ⁹ <https://www.accellion.com/company/press-releases/accellion-provides-update-to-recent-fta-security-incident/>

23 ¹⁰ Press Release: Accellion Provides Update to Recent FTA Security Incident,
24 Accellion.com (Feb. 1, 2021), <https://www.accellion.com/company/press-releases/accellion-provides-update-to-recent-fta-security-incident/>.

1 being transferred using Accellion’s service. SAO was one of Accellion’s customers targeted in
2 the attack, along with 50 others.

3 26. SAO determined that data files from the Washington State Employment
4 Security Department were impacted, including unemployment compensation claim information
5 for more than 1.6 million Washington residents filed between January and December 2020. The
6 unemployment compensation claim information included the person’s name, social security
7 number and/or driver’s license or state identification number, bank account number and bank
8 routing number, and place of employment.¹¹

9 “The compromised files may also include the personal information of other Washington
10 residents who have not yet been identified but whose information was in state agency or
11 local government files under review by the SAO.” *Id.*

12 **C. The Effect of the Data Breach on the Class**

13 27. Given the sensitive nature of the Personal Information stolen in the Data
14 Breach—including names, Social Security numbers, taxpayer identification numbers, and bank
15 account and routing numbers—hackers have the ability to commit identity theft, financial
16 fraud, and other identity-related fraud against Plaintiff and Class members now and into the
17 indefinite future.

18 28. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class members will have to take a
19 variety of steps to monitor for and safeguard against identity theft, and they are at a much
20 greater risk of suffering such identity theft. In addition, these victims of the Data Breach are at
21 a heightened risk of potentially devastating financial identity theft. As the Bureau of Justice
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23 ¹¹ About the Accellion data security breach, Office of the Washington State Auditor,
24 <https://sao.wa.gov/breach2021/> (last updated Feb 1, 2021)

1 Statistics reports, identity theft causes its victims out-of-pocket monetary losses and costs the
2 nation’s economy billions of dollars every year.¹²

3 29. In fact, many victims of the Data Breach have likely already experienced
4 harms as a result of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to, identity theft, financial
5 fraud, tax fraud, unauthorized lines of credit opened in their names, medical and healthcare
6 fraud, and unauthorized access to their bank accounts. Plaintiff and Class members have spent
7 and will spend time, money, and effort dealing with the fallout of the Data Breach, including
8 purchasing credit protection services, contacting their financial institutions, checking credit
9 reports, and spending time and effort searching for unauthorized activity.

10 30. The Personal Information exposed in the Data Breach is highly coveted and
11 valuable on underground or black markets. For example, a cyber “black market” exists in
12 which criminals openly post and sell stolen consumer information on underground internet
13 websites known as the “dark web”—exposing consumers to identity theft and fraud for years to
14 come. Identity thieves can use the Personal Information to: (a) create fake credit cards that can
15 be swiped and used to make purchases as if they were the real credit cards; (b) reproduce stolen
16 debit cards and use them to withdraw cash from ATMs; (c) commit immigration fraud; (d)
17 obtain a fraudulent driver’s license or ID card in the victim’s name; (e) obtain fraudulent
18 government benefits; (f) file a fraudulent tax return using the victim’s information; (g) commit
19 medical and healthcare-related fraud; (h) access financial accounts and records; or (i) commit
20 any number of other frauds, such as obtaining a job, procuring housing, or giving false
21 information to police during an arrest.

22 _____
23 ¹² See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Victims of Identity Theft, 2012*
24 (Dec. 2013), available at <http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit12.pdf> (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).

1 31. Consumers are injured every time their data is stolen and placed on the dark
2 web—even if they have been victims of previous data breaches. Not only is the likelihood of
3 identity theft increased, but the dark web is not like Google or eBay. It is comprised of multiple
4 and discrete repositories of stolen information. Each data breach puts victims at risk of having
5 their information uploaded to different dark web databases and viewed and used by different
6 criminal actors.

7 32. Exposure of this information to the wrong people can have serious
8 consequences. Identity theft can have ripple effects, which can adversely affect the future
9 financial trajectories of victims’ lives. For example, the Identity Theft Resource Center reports
10 that respondents to their surveys in 2013–2016 described that the identity theft they
11 experienced affected their ability to get credit cards and obtain loans, such as student loans or
12 mortgages.¹³ For some victims, this could mean the difference between going to college or not,
13 becoming a homeowner or not, or having to take out a high interest payday loan versus a lower-
14 interest loan.

15 33. Annual monetary losses from identity theft are in the billions of dollars.
16 According to a Presidential Report on identity theft produced in 2007:

17 In addition to the losses that result when identity thieves fraudulently open
18 accounts . . . individual victims often suffer indirect financial costs, including the
19 costs incurred in both civil litigation initiated by creditors and in overcoming the
20 many obstacles they face in obtaining or retaining credit. Victims of non-financial
21 identity theft, for example, health-related or criminal record fraud, face other
22 types of harm and frustration.

21 In addition to out-of-pocket expenses that can reach thousands of dollars for the
22 victims of new account identity theft, and the emotional toll identity theft can take,
23 some victims have to spend what can be a considerable amount of time to repair

23 ¹³ Identity Theft Resource Center, *The Aftermath 2017*,
24 https://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/page-docs/Aftermath_2017.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2019).

1 the damage caused by the identity thieves. Victims of new account identity theft,
2 for example, must correct fraudulent information in their credit reports and
3 monitor their reports for future inaccuracies, close existing bank accounts and
4 open new ones, and dispute charges with individual creditors.¹⁴

5 34. The unauthorized disclosure of Social Security Numbers can be particularly
6 damaging because Social Security Numbers cannot easily be replaced. In order to obtain a new
7 number, a person must prove, among other things, that he or she continues to be disadvantaged
8 by the misuse. Thus, under current rules, no new number can be obtained until damage has
9 been done. Furthermore, as the Social Security Administration warns:

10 A new number probably will not solve all your problems. This is because other
11 governmental agencies (such as the Internal Revenue Service and state motor
12 vehicle agencies) and private businesses (such as banks and credit reporting
13 companies) likely will have records under your old number. Also, because credit
14 reporting companies use the number, along with other Personal Information, to
15 identify your credit record, using a new number will not guarantee you a fresh
16 start. This is especially true if your other Personal Information, such as your name
17 and address, remains the same.

18 If you receive a new Social Security Number, you will not be able to use the old
19 number anymore.

20 For some victims of identity theft, a new number actually creates new problems.
21 If the old credit card information is not associated with the new number, the
22 absence of any credit history under the new number may make it more difficult
23 for you to get credit.¹⁵

24 35. According to the Attorney General of the United States, Social Security
numbers “can be an identity thief’s most valuable piece of consumer information.”¹⁶ Indeed, as

21 ¹⁴ FTC, *Combating Identity Theft A Strategic Plan* (April 2007), available at
22 [https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/combating-identity-theft-strategic-
23 plan/strategicplan.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/combating-identity-theft-strategic-plan/strategicplan.pdf) (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).

24 ¹⁵ Social Security Administration, *Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number* (June
2017), available at <http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10064.html> (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).

¹⁶ *Fact Sheet: The Work of the President’s Identity Theft Task Force*, DOJ 06-636, 2006
WL 2679771 (Sep. 19, 2006).

1 explained recently: “The ubiquity of the SSN as an identifier makes it a primary target for both
2 hackers and identity thieves. . . . When data breaches expose SSNs, thieves can use these
3 numbers—usually combined with other pieces of data—to impersonate individuals and apply
4 for loans, housing, utilities, or government benefits. Additionally, this information may be sold
5 on the black market to other hackers.”¹⁷

6 36. As the result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class members are likely to
7 suffer economic loss and other actual harm for which they are entitled to damages, including,
8 but not limited to, the following:

- 9 a. losing the inherent value of their Personal Information;
- 10 b. costs associated with the detection and prevention of identity theft and
11 unauthorized use of their financial accounts;
- 12 c. costs associated with purchasing credit monitoring, credit freezes, and
13 identity theft protection services;
- 14 d. lowered credit scores resulting from credit inquiries following fraudulent
15 activities;
- 16 e. costs associated with time spent and the loss of productivity or the
17 enjoyment of one’s life from taking time to address and attempt to mitigate
18 and address the actual and future consequences of the Data Breach,
19 including discovering fraudulent charges, cancelling and reissuing cards,
20 purchasing credit monitoring and identity theft protection services,
21 imposing withdrawal and purchase limits on compromised accounts, and
22 the stress, nuisance and annoyance of dealing with the repercussions of the
23 Data Breach; and
- 24 f. the continued imminent and certainly impending injury flowing from potential
fraud and identify theft posed by their Personal Information being in the
possession of one or many unauthorized third parties.

21 37. Even in instances where a consumer is reimbursed for a financial loss due to
22 identity theft or fraud, that does not make that individual whole again, as there is typically

23 ¹⁷ Daniel J. Marcus, *The Data Breach Dilemma: Proactive Solutions for Protecting*
24 *Consumers' Personal Information*, 68 Duke L.J. 555, 564–65 (2018).

1 significant time and effort associated with seeking reimbursement that is not refunded. The
2 Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics found that identity theft victims “reported
3 spending an average of about 7 hours clearing up the issues” relating to identity theft or fraud.¹⁸

4 38. There may also be a significant time lag between when personal information is
5 stolen and when it is actually misused. According to the GAO, which conducted a study
6 regarding data breaches:

7 [L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen data may be held
8 for up to a year or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once
9 stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that
10 information may continue for years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure
11 the harm resulting from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future
12 harm.¹⁹

11 **D. Plaintiff’s Individual Allegations**

12 39. Plaintiff Stahl applied for unemployment benefits from the State of
13 Washington in 2020. As part of his application, Plaintiff Stahl was required to provide sensitive
14 Personal Information, including his Social Security number and banking information. Given the
15 highly sensitive nature of the information stolen in the Data Breach, Plaintiff Stahl remains at a
16 substantial and imminent risk of future harm, including identity theft and theft from his bank
17 accounts. Plaintiff Stahl has expended and will be required to expended time and effort
18 monitoring his financial accounts and credit reports.

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21 ¹⁸ E. Harrell, U.S. Department of Justice, *Victims of Identity Theft, 2014* (revised Nov.
22 13, 2017), <http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf> (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).

23 ¹⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters, *Data*
24 *Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full*
Extent Is Unknown (June 2007), <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf> (last visited Nov.
22, 2019).

1 **V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

2 40. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of a class (the “Class”)
3 preliminarily defined as:

4 All individuals residing in the United States whose personal information was
5 compromised in the data breach disclosed by the Washington State Auditor in
6 January 2021.

7 Excluded from the Class are Defendants; any agent, affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of any
8 Defendant; any entity in which any Defendant has a controlling interest; any officer or director
9 of any Defendant; any successor or assign of any Defendant; and any Judge to whom this case
10 is assigned as well as his or her staff and immediate family.

11 41. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition.

12 42. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
13 requirements of CR 23.

14 a) **Numerosity.** Plaintiff is a representative of the proposed Class
15 reportedly consisting of approximately one million members—far too many to join in a
16 single action.

17 b) **Ascertainability.** Class members are readily identifiable from
18 information in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control.

19 c) **Typicality.** Plaintiff’s claims are typical of Class members’ claims as
20 each arises from the same Data Breach, the same alleged negligence of and/or statutory
21 violations by Defendant, and the same unreasonable manner of notifying individuals
22 regarding the Data Breach.

23 d) **Adequacy.** Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
24 the proposed Class. His interests do not conflict with Class members’ interests and he

1 has retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation and data privacy to
2 vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of the Class, including in the capacity as lead
3 counsel.

4 e) **Commonality.** Plaintiff's and Class members' claims raise
5 predominantly common factual and legal questions that can be answered for all Class
6 members through a single class-wide proceeding. For example, to resolve any Class
7 member's claims, it will be necessary to answer the following questions:

8 A. Whether Defendant sold a file transfer product that was vulnerable to
9 cyberattack and that was inadequate to protect the transfer of sensitive
10 files;

11 B. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable security
12 procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the
13 information compromised in the Data Breach;

14 C. Whether Defendant's conduct was negligent;

15 D. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to damages, treble damages,
16 and/or injunctive relief.

17 43. In addition to satisfying the prerequisites of CR 23(a), Plaintiff satisfies the
18 requirements for maintaining a class action under CR 23(b). Common questions of law and
19 fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is
20 superior to individual litigation or any other available methods for the fair and efficient
21 adjudication of the controversy. The damages available to individual plaintiffs are insufficient
22 to make litigation addressing Defendant's privacy practices economically feasible in the
23 absence of the class action procedure.

1 50. Defendant’s duty of care arose as a result of Defendant’s knowledge that
2 customers trusted its product to protect confidential data. Only Defendant was in a position to
3 ensure that its systems were sufficient to protect against the harm to Plaintiff and the members
4 of the Class from a data breach of exploiting FTA’s vulnerabilities.

5 51. In addition, Defendant had a duty to use reasonable security measures under
6 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits “unfair . . .
7 practices in or affecting commerce,” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the
8 unfair practice of failing to use reasonable measures to protect confidential data.

9 52. Defendant also had a duty to use reasonable care in protecting confidential
10 data because they committed to comply with industry standards for the protection of Personal
11 Information.

12 53. Defendant knew, or should have known, of the risks inherent in the
13 vulnerabilities in the FTA product, and the importance of adequate security to FTA users.

14 54. By failing to use reasonable measures to secure its FTA product, by continuing
15 to offer the FTA product as a product for secure file transfers of Personal Information despite
16 its vulnerabilities, and by failing to cure those vulnerabilities, Defendant breached its duties to
17 Plaintiff and the Class.

18 55. Plaintiff and Class members have suffered harm as a result of Defendant’s
19 negligence. These victims suffered diminished value of their sensitive information. Plaintiff
20 and Class also lost control over the Personal Information exposed, which subjected each of
21 them to a greatly enhanced risk of identity theft, medical identity theft, credit and bank fraud,
22 Social Security fraud, tax fraud, and myriad other types of fraud and theft, in addition to the
23 time and expenses spent mitigating those injuries and preventing further injury.

1 **VII. SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF**
2 **Violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW § 19.86, et seq.**
3 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and Class)**

4 56. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all foregoing factual allegations.

5 57. Defendant is a “person” within the meaning of the Washington Consumer
6 Protection Act, RCW 19.86.010(1), and they conduct “trade” and “commerce” within the
7 meaning of RCW 19.86.010(2).

8 58. Plaintiff and other members of the Class are “persons” within the meaning of
9 RCW 19.86.010(1).

10 59. Defendant’s failure to safeguard the Personal Information exposed in the Data
11 Breach constitutes an unfair act that offends public policy.

12 60. Defendant’s failure to safeguard the Personal Information compromised in the
13 Data Breach caused substantial injury to Plaintiff and Class members. Defendant’s failure is not
14 outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competitors, and it was not
15 reasonably avoidable by consumers.

16 61. Defendant’s failure to safeguard the Personal Information disclosed in the
17 Data Breach, and its failure to provide timely and complete notice of that Data Breach to the
18 victims, is unfair because these acts and practices are immoral, unethical, oppressive, and/or
19 unscrupulous.

20 62. Defendant’s unfair acts or practices occurred in its trade or business and have
21 and injured and are capable of injuring a substantial portion of the public. Defendant’s general
22 course of conduct as alleged herein is injurious to the public interest, and the acts complained
23 of herein are ongoing and/or have a substantial likelihood of being repeated.
24

- 1 C. Equitable relief enjoining Defendant from engaging in the wrongful conduct
2 complained of herein and compelling Defendant to utilize appropriate methods
3 and policies with respect to maintaining the security of its file transfer products;
4 D. An award of costs of suit and attorneys' fees, as allowable by law;
5 E. An award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, as provided by law;
6 F. Leave to amend this Complaint to conform to the evidence produced at trial; and
7 G. Such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

8 Dated: February 2, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

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